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   Cryptographic Algorithms for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
 
 Abstract
 
    The TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) relies on security algorithms
    to provide authentication between two end-points.  There are many
    such algorithms available, and two TCP-AO systems cannot interoperate
    unless they are using the same algorithms.  This document specifies
    the algorithms and attributes that can be used in TCP-AO’s current
    manual keying mechanism and provides the interface for future message
    authentication codes (MACs).
 
 Status of This Memo
 
    This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 
    This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
    (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
    received public review and has been approved for publication by the
    Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
    Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 
    Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5926.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
    Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust’s Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
    to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
    include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
    the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
    described in the Simplified BSD License.
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 1.  Introduction
 
    This document is a companion to [RFC5925].  Like most modern security
    protocols, TCP-AO allows users to choose which cryptographic
    algorithm(s) they want to use to meet their security needs.
 
    TCP-AO provides cryptographic authentication and message integrity
    verification between two end-points.  In order to accomplish this
    function, message authentication codes (MACs) are used, which then
    rely on shared keys.  There are various ways to create MACs.  The use
    of hash-based MACs (HMACs) is defined in [RFC2104].  The use of
    cipher-based MACs (CMACs) is defined in [NIST-SP800-38B].
 
    This RFC defines the general requirements for MACs used in TCP-AO,
    both for currently specified MACs and for any future specified MACs.
    It specifies two MAC algorithms required in all TCP-AO
    implementations.  It also specifies two key derivation functions
    (KDFs) used to create the traffic keys used by the MACs.  These KDFs
    are also required by all TCP-AO implementations.
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 2.  Requirements
 
 2.1.  Requirements Language
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
 
    When used in lowercase, these words convey their typical use in
    common language, and they are not to be interpreted as described in
    [RFC2119].
 
 2.2.  Algorithm Requirements
 
    This is the initial specification of required cryptography for
    TCP-AO, and indicates two MAC algorithms and two KDFs.  All four
    components MUST be implemented in order for the implementation to be
    fully compliant with this RFC.
 
    The following table indicates the required MAC algorithms and KDFs
    for TCP-AO:
 
            Requirement      Authentication Algorithm
 
            ------------     ------------------------
 
            MUST             HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2104][FIPS-180-3]
 
            MUST             AES-128-CMAC-96 [NIST-SP800-38B][FIPS197]
 
            Requirement      Key Derivation Function (KDF)
 
            -------------    ------------------------
 
            MUST             KDF_HMAC_SHA1
 
            MUST             KDF_AES_128_CMAC
 
    For an explanation of why two MAC algorithms were mandated, see the
    Section 4.
 
 2.3.  Requirements for Future MAC Algorithms
 
    TCP-AO is intended to support cryptographic agility.  As a result,
    this document includes recommendations in various places for future
    MAC and KDF algorithms when used for TCP-AO.  For future MAC
    algorithms specifically, they SHOULD protect at least 2**48 messages
    with a collision probability of less than one in 10**9.
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 3.  Algorithms Specified
 
    TCP-AO requires two classes of cryptographic algorithms used on a
    particular connection, and refers to this document to define them
    both:
 
        (1)  Key Derivation Functions (KDFs), which name a pseudorandom
             function (PRF) and use a Master_Key and some connection-
             specific input with that PRF to produce Traffic_Keys, the
             keys suitable for authenticating and integrity checking
             individual TCP segments, as described in TCP-AO.
 
        (2)  Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms, which take a
             key and a message and produce an authentication tag that can
             be used to verify the integrity and authenticity of those
             messages.
 
    In TCP-AO, these algorithms are always used in pairs.  Each MAC
    algorithm MUST specify the KDF to be used with that MAC algorithm.
    However, a KDF MAY be used with more than one MAC algorithm.
 
 3.1.  Key Derivation Functions (KDFs)
 
    TCP-AO’s Traffic_Keys are derived using KDFs.  The KDFs used in TCP-
    AO’s current manual keying have the following interface:
 
        Traffic_Key = KDF_alg(Master_Key, Context, Output_Length)
 
    where:
 
       - KDF_alg:     the specific pseudorandom function (PRF) that is
                      the basic building block used in constructing the
                      given Traffic_Key.
 
       - Master_Key:  In TCP-AO’s manual key mode, this is a key shared
                      by both peers, entered via some interface to their
                      respective configurations.  The Master_Key is used
                      as the seed for the KDF.  We assume that this is a
                      human-readable pre-shared key (PSK); thus, we
                      assume it is of variable length.  Master_Keys
                      SHOULD be random, but might not be (e.g., badly
                      chosen by the user).  For interoperability, the
                      management interface by which the PSK is configured
                      MUST accept ASCII strings, and SHOULD also allow
                      for the configuration of any arbitrary binary
                      string in hexadecimal form.  Other configuration
                      methods MAY be supported.
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       - Context:     A binary string containing information related to
                      the specific connection for this derived keying
                      material, as defined in [RFC5925], Section 5.2.
 
       - Output_Length:  The length, in bits, of the key that the KDF
                         will produce.  This length must be the size
                         required for the MAC algorithm that will use the
                         PRF result as a seed.
 
    When invoked, a KDF generates a string of length Output_Length bits
    based on the Master_Key and context value.  This result may then be
    used as a cryptographic key for any algorithm that takes an
    Output_Length length key.  A KDF MAY specify a maximum Output_Length
    parameter.
 
 3.1.1.  Concrete KDFs
 
    This document defines two KDF algorithms, each paired with a
    corresponding PRF algorithm as explained below:
 
        *  KDF_HMAC_SHA1  based on PRF-HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104][FIPS-180-3]
 
        *  KDF_AES_128_CMAC  based on AES-CMAC-PRF-128
                             [NIST-SP800-38B][FIPS197]
 
    Both of these KDFs are based on the iteration-mode KDFs specified in
    [NIST-SP800-108].  This means that they use an underlying
    pseudorandom function (PRF) with a fixed-length output, 128 bits in
    the case of the AES-CMAC, and 160 bits in the case of HMAC-SHA1.  The
    KDF generates an arbitrary number of output bits by operating the PRF
    in a "counter mode", where each invocation of the PRF uses a
    different input block differentiated by a block counter.
 
    Each input block is constructed as follows:
 
         ( i || Label || Context || Output_Length )
 
       Where
 
       - "||":      For any X || Y, "||" represents a concatenation
                    operation of the binary strings X and Y.
 
       - i:         A counter, a binary string that is an input to each
                    iteration of the PRF in counter mode.  The counter
                    "i" is represented in a single octet.  The number of
                    iterations will depend on the specific size of the
                    Output_Length desired for a given MAC. "i" always
                    starts = 1.
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       - Label:     A binary string that clearly identifies the purpose
                    of this KDF’s derived keying material.  For TCP-AO,
                    we use the ASCII string "TCP-AO", where the last
                    character is the capital letter "O", not to be
                    confused with a zero.  While this may seem like
                    overkill in this specification since TCP-AO only
                    describes one call to the KDF, it is included in
                    order to comply with FIPS 140 certifications.
 
       - Context:   The context argument provided to the KDF interface,
                    as described above in Section 3.1 .
 
       - Output_Length:  The length, in bits, of the key that the KDF
                         will produce.  The Output_length is represented
                         within two octets.  This length must be the size
                         required for the MAC algorithm that will use the
                         PRF result as a seed.
 
    The output of multiple PRF invocations is simply concatenated.  For
    the Traffic_Key, values of multiple PRF invocations are concatenated
    and truncated as needed to create a Traffic_Key of the desired
    length.  For instance, if one were using KDF_HMAC_SHA1, which uses a
    160-bit internal PRF to generate 320 bits of data, one would execute
    the PRF twice, once with i=1 and once with i=2.  The result would be
    the entire output of the first invocation concatenated with the
    second invocation.  For example,
 
   Traffic_Key =
           KDF_alg(Master_Key, 1 || Label || Context || Output_length) ||
           KDF_alg(Master_Key, 2 || Label || Context || Output_length)
 
    If the number of bits required is not an exact multiple of the output
    size of the PRF, then the output of the final invocation of the PRF
    is truncated as necessary.
 
 3.1.1.1.  KDF_HMAC_SHA1
 
    For KDF_HMAC_SHA1:
 
    - PRF for KDF_alg:  HMAC-SHA1 [RFC2104][FIPS-180-3].
 
    - Use:       HMAC-SHA1(Key, Input).
 
    - Key:       Master_Key, configured by user, and passed to the KDF.
 
    - Input:     ( i || Label || Context || Output_Length)
 
    - Output_Length:  160 bits.
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    - Result:    Traffic_Key, used in the MAC function by TCP-AO.
 
 3.1.1.2.  KDF_AES_128_CMAC
 
    For KDF_AES_128_CMAC:
 
    - PRF for KDF_alg:  AES-CMAC-PRF-128 [NIST-SP800-38B][FIPS197].
 
    - Use:       AES-CMAC(Key, Input).
 
    - Key:       Master_Key (see usage below)
 
    - Input:     ( i || Label || Context || Output_Length)
 
    - Output_Length:  128 bits.
 
    - Result:    Traffic_Key, used in the MAC function by TCP-AO
 
    The Master_Key in TCP-AO’s current manual keying mechanism is a
    shared secret, entered by an administrator.  It is passed via an out-
    of-band mechanism between two devices, and often between two
    organizations.  The shared secret does not have to be 16 octets, and
    the length may vary.  However, AES_128_CMAC requires a key of exactly
    16 octets (128 bits) in length.  We could mandate that
    implementations force administrators to input Master_Keys of exactly
    128-bit length when using AES_128_CMAC, and with sufficient
    randomness, but this places undue burden on the implementors and
    deployers.  This specification RECOMMENDS that deployers use a
    randomly generated 128-bit string as the Master_Key, but acknowledges
    that deployers may not.
 
    To handle variable length Master_Keys, we use the same mechanism as
    described in [RFC4615], Section 3.  First, we use AES_128_CMAC with a
    fixed key of all zeros as a "randomness extractor", while using the
    shared secret Master_Key, MK, as the message input, to produce a 128-
    bit key Derived_Master_Key (K).  Second, we use the result as a key,
    and run AES-128_CMAC again, this time using the result K as the Key,
    and the true input block as the Input to yield the Traffic_Key (TK)
    used in the MAC over the message.  The description follows:
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    +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    +                        KDF-AES-128-CMAC                           +
    +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    +                                                                   +
    + Input  : MK (Master_Key, the variable-length shared secret)       +
    +        : I (Input, i.e., the input data of the PRF)               +
    +        : MKlen (length of MK in octets)                           +
    +        : len (length of M in octets)                              +
    + Output : TK (Traffic_Key, 128-bit Pseudo-Random Variable)         +
    +                                                                   +
    +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
    + Variable: K (128-bit key for AES-CMAC)                            +
    +                                                                   +
    + Step 1.   If MKlen is equal to 16                                 +
    + Step 1a.  then                                                    +
    +               K := MK;                                            +
    + Step 1b.  else                                                    +
    +               K := AES-CMAC(0^128, MK, MKlen);                    +
    + Step 2.   TK := AES-CMAC(K, I, len);                              +
    +           return TK;                                              +
    +                                                                   +
    +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 
                                  Figure 1
 
    In step 1, the 128-bit key, K, for AES-CMAC is derived as follows:
 
    o If the Master_Key, MK, provided by the administrator is exactly 128
    bits, then we use it as is.
 
    o If it is longer or shorter than 128 bits, then we derive the key K
    by applying the AES-CMAC algorithm using the 128-bit all-zero string
    as the key and MK as the input message.  This step is described in
    1b.
 
    In step 2, we apply the AES-CMAC algorithm again, this time using K
    as the key and I as the input message.
 
    The output of this algorithm returns TK, the Traffic_Key, which is
    128 bits and is suitable for use in the MAC function on each TCP
    segment of the connection.
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 3.1.1.3.  Tips for User Interfaces Regarding KDFs
 
    This section provides suggested representations for the KDFs in
    implementation user interfaces (UIs).  Following these guidelines
    across common implementations will make interoperability easier and
    simpler for deployers.
 
    UIs SHOULD refer to the choice of KDF_HMAC_SHA1 as simply "SHA1".
 
    UIs SHOULD refer to the choice of KDF_AES_128_CMAC as simply
    "AES128".
 
    The initial IANA registry values reflect these two entries.
 
    UIs SHOULD use KDF_HMAC_SHA1 as the default selection in TCP-AO
    settings.  KDF_HMAC_SHA1 is preferred at this time because it has
    wide support, being present in most implementations in the
    marketplace.
 
 3.2.  MAC Algorithms
 
    Each MAC_alg defined for TCP-AO has three fixed elements as part of
    its definition:
 
    - KDF_Alg:     Name of the TCP-AO KDF algorithm used to generate the
                   Traffic_Key.
 
    - Key_Length:  Length, in bits, required for the Traffic_Key used in
                   this MAC.
 
    - MAC_Length:  The final length of the bits used in the TCP-AO MAC
                   field.  This value may be a truncation of the MAC
                   function’s original output length.
 
    MACs computed for TCP-AO have the following interface:
 
        MAC = MAC_alg(Traffic_Key, Message)
 
    where:
 
       - MAC_alg:     MAC Algorithm used.
 
       - Traffic_Key: Variable; the result of KDF.
 
       -  Message     The message to be authenticated, as specified in
                      [RFC5925], Section 5.1.
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    This document specifies two MAC algorithm options for generating the
    MAC as used by TCP-AO:
 
        *  HMAC-SHA-1-96  based on [RFC2104] and [FIPS-180-3].
 
        *  AES-128-CMAC-96  based on [NIST-SP800-38B][FIPS197]
 
    Both provide a high level of security and efficiency.  The AES-128-
    CMAC-96 is potentially more efficient, particularly in hardware, but
    HMAC-SHA-1-96 is more widely used in Internet protocols and in most
    cases could be supported with little or no additional code in today’s
    deployed software and devices.
 
    An important aspect to note about these algorithms’ definitions for
    use in TCP-AO is the fact that the MAC outputs are truncated to 96
    bits.  AES-128-CMAC-96 produces a 128-bit MAC, and HMAC SHA-1
    produces a 160-bit result.  The MAC output is then truncated to 96
    bits to provide a reasonable trade-off between security and message
    size, for fitting into the TCP-AO option field.
 
 3.2.1.  The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96
 
    By definition, HMAC [RFC2104] requires a cryptographic hash function.
    SHA1 will be that hash function used for authenticating and providing
    integrity validation on TCP segments with HMAC.
 
    The three fixed elements for HMAC-SHA-1-96 are:
 
    - KDF_Alg:     KDF_HMAC_SHA1.
 
    - Key_Length:  160 bits.
 
    - MAC_Length:  96 bits.
 
    For:
 
         MAC = MAC_alg (Traffic_Key, Message)
 
    HMAC-SHA-1-96 for TCP-AO has the following values:
 
       - MAC_alg:     HMAC-SHA1.
 
       - Traffic_Key: Variable; the result of the KDF.
 
       - Message:     The message to be authenticated, as specified in
                      [RFC5925], Section 5.1.
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 3.2.2.  The Use of AES-128-CMAC-96
 
    In the context of TCP-AO, when we say "AES-128-CMAC-96", we actually
    define a usage of AES-128 as a cipher-based MAC according to
    [NIST-SP800-38B].
 
    The three fixed elements for AES-128-CMAC-96 are:
 
    - KDF_Alg:     KDF_AES_128_CMAC.
 
    - Key_Length:  128 bits.
 
    - MAC_Length:  96 bits.
 
    For:
 
         MAC = MAC_alg (Traffic_Key, Message)
 
    AES-128-CMAC-96 for TCP-AO has the following values:
 
       - MAC_alg:     AES-128-CMAC-96.  [NIST-SP800-38B]
 
       - Traffic_Key: Variable; the result of the KDF.
 
       - Message:     The message to be authenticated, as specified in
                      [RFC5925], Section 5.1.
 
 4.  Security Considerations
 
    This document inherits all of the security considerations of the
    TCP-AO [RFC5925], the AES-CMAC [RFC4493], and the HMAC-SHA-1
    [RFC2104] documents.
 
    The security of cryptography-based systems depends on both the
    strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of
    the keys used with those algorithms.  The security also depends on
    the engineering of the protocol used by the system to ensure that
    there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the
    overall system.
 
    Care should also be taken to ensure that the selected key is
    unpredictable, avoiding any keys known to be weak for the algorithm
    in use.  [RFC4086] contains helpful information on both key
    generation techniques and cryptographic randomness.
 
    Note that in the composition of KDF_AES_128_CMAC, the PRF needs a
    128-bit / 16-byte key as the seed.  However, for convenience to the
    administrators/deployers, we did not want to force them to enter a
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    16-byte Master_Key.  So we specified the sub-key routine that could
    handle a variable length Master_Key, one that might be less than 16
    bytes.  This does NOT mean that it is safe for administrators to use
    weak keys.  Administrators are encouraged to follow [RFC4086] as
    listed above.  We simply attempted to "put a fence around
    foolishness", as much as possible.
 
    This document concerns itself with the selection of cryptographic
    algorithms for the use of TCP-AO.  The algorithms identified in this
    document as "MUST implement" are not known to be broken at the
    current time, and cryptographic research so far leads us to believe
    that they will likely remain secure into the foreseeable future.
    Some of the algorithms may be found in the future to have properties
    significantly weaker than those that were believed at the time this
    document was produced.  Expect that new revisions of this document
    will be issued from time to time.  Be sure to search for more recent
    versions of this document before implementing.
 
    NOTE EXPLAINING WHY TWO MAC ALGORITHMS WERE MANDATED:
 
    Two MAC algorithms and two corresponding KDFs are mandated as a
    result of discussion in the TCPM WG, and in consultation with the
    Security Area Directors.  SHA-1 was selected because it is widely
    deployed and currently has sufficient strength and reasonable
    computational cost, so it is a "MUST" for TCP-AO today.  The security
    strength of SHA-1 HMACs should be sufficient for the foreseeable
    future, especially given that the tags are truncated to 96 bits.
 
    Recently exposed vulnerabilities in other MACs (e.g., MD5 or HMAC
    MD5) aren’t practical on HMAC-SHA-1, but these types of analyses are
    mounting and could potentially pose a concern for HMAC forgery if
    they were significantly improved, over time.  The security issues
    driving the migration from SHA-1 to SHA-256 for digital signatures
    [HMAC-ATTACK] do not immediately render SHA-1 weak for this
    application of SHA-1 in HMAC mode.
 
    AES-128 CMAC is considered to be a stronger algorithm than SHA-1, but
    may not yet have very wide implementation.  AES-128 CMAC is also a
    "MUST" to implement, in order to drive vendors toward its use, and to
    allow for another MAC option, if SHA-1 were to be compromised.
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 5.  IANA Considerations
 
    IANA has created the following registry (http://www.iana.org).
 
    Registry Name: Cryptographic Algorithms for TCP-AO Registration
    Procedure: RFC Publication after Expert Review
 
    Initial contents of this registry are:
 
          Algorithm      | Reference
         ----------------|-----------
          SHA1           | [RFC5926]
          AES128         | [RFC5926]
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